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The Court then answered two questions: (i) whether the "necessity deternination" section of the CWA contains sufficiently specific language to allow judicial
review; and (ii) whether the EPA did, in fact, have the discretion to decide
against making a necessity determination.
First, the Court found the CWA to possess sufficiendy specific language;
the CWA dictated that water quality standards "shall be established taking into
consideration their use and value for public water supplies, propagation of fish
and wildlife, recreational purposes, and.. . use and value for navigation." The
specificity of these considerations provides the EPA with a basis for explanation,
thereby allowing for judicial review. The Court further concluded that the
"mandatory language" of these sections of the CWA suggests reviewability.
Courts have found provisions with discrefionuy and suggestive language, such
as the agency "may" regulate, to be unreviewable. However, the relevant sections of the CWA dictate that the Administrator "shall" create new standards
when necessary. Thus, the Court held that it possessed subject matter jurisdiction to review the EPA's action.
Second, the Court disagreed with the trial court's finding that the EPA
lacked discretionary authority to decline a necessity determination. The Court
revisited the ruling in Massachusets,holding that the case's "reasonable explanation" standard also applies to this section of the CWA. Mas'sachusets holding requires the district court to analyze the EPA's explanation and determine
whether the explanation reflects the language of the CWA. Noting the highly
deferential nature of this standard, the Court described the EPA's burden as
"slight".. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the EPA must provide such an explanation to the district court to justify the agency's refusal.
Accordingly, the Court vacated the order of the district court and remanded
the case for proceedings consistent with its ruling.
Stephen Klein
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Sierra Club, Inc. v. Bostick, 787 F.3d 1043 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that
by issuing Nationwide Permit 12 and verifying that the construction of the
TransCanada pipeline was covered under the permit, the United States Army
Corps of Engineers did not violate the National Environmental Policy Act, the
Clean Water Act, or its own nationwide permit).
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") has the authority, under Section 404(e) of the Clean Water Act, to issue nationwide permits authorizing
activities that involve the discharge of dredged material into waters and wetlands.
The Corps issued a nationwide permit, Nationwide Permit 12 ("Permit"), which
permitted anyone to build utility lines in waters as long as the construction did
not result in a loss of greater than one-half acre of water for each single and
complete project.
TransCanada Corporation ("TransCanada"), sought to build the Gulf
Coast Pipeline ("Pipeline"), an oil pipeline which would cross 2,000 waterways
and expand across 485 miles. The Corps verified, in several letters, that the
Permit permitted construction of TransCanada's pipeline. Based off the Corp's
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verification, TransCanada constructed, completed, and began using the Pipeline.
Concerned about the Pipeline's effect on the environment, Sierra Club,
Inc., Clean Energy Future of Oklahoma, and East Texas Sub Regional Planning
Commission (collectively "the eivironmental groups") challenged the Corps'
authority to issue Nationwide Permit 12. The United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma ("district court") entered judgment in favor
of the Corps. The environmental groups appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals, Tenth Circuit ("Court"). The environmental groups asserted three
major claims on appeal: (i) that the Corps violated the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA") when it issued the Permit and letters without considering
the risk of oil spills and the cumulative impacts on the environment; (ii) that
Nationwide Permit 12 violates Section 404(e) of the Clean Water Act because
it permits activities that cause more than minimal environmental impacts and
because it defers a part of the minimal-impact determination to project-level
personnel; and (iii) that the Corps violated its own Permit when it failed to conduct an analysis of the Pipeline's cumulative effects on the environment.
The Court first addressed the claim that the Corps violated NEPA when it
failed to consider the risks of oil spills and the Pipeline's cumulative impacts.
The Court held that the environmental groups waived their NEPA claims. The
Court noted that the Corps met the NEPA requirements because, under
NEPA, no further analysis is required beyond an environmental assessment if
the assessment indicates that the environmental impact of the proposed action
is insignificant. Further, the Court noted that a party challenging NEPA compliance must raise any relevant objections to the proposed project during the
public comment period. A party waives its claim if it does not raise it during
such period, unless the environmental assessment's flaw is an obvious flaw or
the issue is otherwise brought to the agency's attention.
First, the Court analyzed whether the risk of an oil spill was an obvious flaw
in the assessment. The Court determined that the environmental groups were
required, and failed, to show that the Corps' assessment for the construction,
maintenance, and repair of utility lines contained an obvious flaw. The Court
found that the Corps appropriately considered the impacts from the construction of the Pipeline-the permitted activity-and not the impact associated with
operation of the Pipeline, which fell under the authority of other agencies. Additionally, the Court noted that even if the Corps knew about the risk of oil spills
from other sources, it made no difference because the duty to assess that risk
belonged to another agency. Second, the Court addressed whether the environmental groups waived their claim that the Corps violated NEPA by failing
to consider the pipeline's cumulative impact. The Court held that the environmental groups waived their claim because no commentator raised this objection
during the relevant public comment period.
Next, the Court analyzed the environmental groups' argument that NEPA
required the Corps to conduct an environmental analysis before issuing the verification letters to TransCanada, because the letters constituted "major Federal
actions." The Court disagreed with the environmental groups and held that the
Corps complied with NEPA. The Court noted that NEPA requires agencies
to conduct an analysis of potential impacts of all major Federal actions, but that
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the letter would only constitute a "major Federal action" if such verification resulted in a significant impact. The Court found that the Corps considered the
impact of the construction of an oil pipeline when it issued Nationwide Permit
12, and that the letters only venilied that TransCanada's actions were covered
by the Permit. Therefore, the Court held there was no need for the Corps to
conduct a second environmental assessment.
The Court then considered the environmental groups' argument that the
Corps violated the Clean Water Act when it issued Nationwide Permit 12. The
environmental groups argued the Permit violated the Clean Water Act in two
ways: (i) because the Permit allows activities that have more than minimal environmental impacts; and (ii) because it defers a part of the minimal-impact determination to project-level personnel. The Court held that the Corps did not
violate Section 404(e) when it issued Nationwide Permit 12 because it used its
long-standing practice for assessing impacts based on its technical expertise.
The Court found the environmental groups failed to show that the Corps' test
did not adequately control aquatic impact.
The Court then considered the Corps' interpretation of Section 404(e) as
allowing the Corps to use project-level personnel in portions of the minimalimpact analysis. When analyzing the case under Chevron, the Court noted that
there was no direction from Congress as to whether assigning project-level personnel such duties is permissible. Because Congress had not directly spoken
on the issue, the Court determined that the Corps' interpretation of Section
404(e) was permissible because nationwide permitting is complicated and the
Corps' interpretation provided a reasonable saeguard fiom unforeseen impacts. The Court reasoned that the Corps recognized that it could not predict
every potential use of Nationwide Permit 12, but that it made an assessment of
all predictable uses-including construction of an oil pipeline-so the Corps did
not need to conduct a new environmental analysis. Additionally, the Court
noted that the use of project-level personnel did not affect the public's ability to
comment on the proposed permits because the Corps prepares a written impact
evaluation of authorized activity; it only defers aspects of the evaluation that it
cannot practically undertake before the start of a project.
Lastly, the Court addressed the environmental groups claim that the Corps
violated its own Permit when it filed to document its cumulative impact analysis
in the verification letters and in its administrative records regarding the analysis.
The Court held that there was no violation because the Corps has never required district engineers to include the analysis in a verification letter, as long as
the record supported the letter. The Court found that in this case the record
included sufficient facts to support that the district engineers considered cumulative impacts.
Therefore, the Court found that the environmental groups waived their
NEPA claims by failing to object during the appropriate public comment period. The Court rejected the remainder of the environmental groups' arguments. The Court held that, by issuing Nationwide Permit 12 and verifying the
construction of TransCanada's pipeline under the Permit, the Corps did not
violate N EPA, the Clean Water Act, or its own Permit.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision.
Heather Campbell

